

Western Resource Adequacy Program

PRC Task Force - PRM Meeting

September 16th, 2025; 10am-12pm PPT

Task Force Member Attendance:

Name
Brandon Holmes
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Akhil Mandadi
Nicole Blackwell
Andres Valdepena Delgado
Ben Brandt
Lindsey Schlekeway
Rodger Mazano
Anthony Lusardi
Steve Belcoff
Michael Goodenough
Glen Tang
Ryan Holyk
Leah Marquez Glynn
Thad LeVar
Carly Page
Connor Lennon
Ed Mount
Sachi Begur
Phil Haines
Stefan Cristea
Devin Mounts
Teyent Gossa

Meeting Agenda

1. Debrief from RAPC discussion on TF Concept Paper

- a. Withdrawal notice/5-year exit
- b. 10-year advisory metrics soon (i.e., not waiting for transition to 5-year binding)
- c. Locking down ELCC at 5 years
- d. Season Duration/Shoulder Months
- e. 20-year advisory

2. Locking down ELCC at 5 years

- <u>Context</u>: PAC asked to align ELCC lock with PRM (5 years). This was deferred in July as out of the current TF scope.
- <u>Discussion</u>: Early locking increases risk; desire for more lead time on QCC is valid, but 5 years may be too long seek a balance of accuracy vs. timeliness.
- <u>Direction</u>: Do not set a firm timeline now. Provide a recommendation only on potential timing ranges.
- Next steps:
 - Recommend Spring 2026 Task Force to evaluate ELCC timing (parallel to P50/load forecast work).
 - Invite PAC to a future TF session; revisit 7/31 materials on risk of locking earlier and bring back a summary.

3. Withdrawal notice/5-year exit

• <u>Context:</u> Aspirational idea to align exit notice with metric-setting/data collection (i.e., move to 5 years). Concern that such a long exit period for a voluntary program is overly burdensome.

WRAP

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- <u>Discussion</u>: Perceived low risk from exits post-Oct 31 decision and after markets mature; PRM adjustments could be handled without a 5-year commitment. Prefer to revisit after Transition Period when the program is mature.
- <u>Direction</u>: Keep 2-year notice in place; remove the 5-year exit goal from the current concept paper.
- Recommendation (future): After the transition and once fully binding—and with DA market developments clearer—reassess aligning exit timing with metric-setting.
- Action Items:
 - WPP and Co-Chairs to update concept paper to reflect 2-year exit retained and future review of exit timing post-Transition Period.

4. Methodology

Discussion:

- Aim: Capture promising methods worth advancing.
- Devin at PGE presented his proposal that was previewed at the last meeting. Uses a weighted
 average of the seasonal LOL profile to shape seasonal PRM, recognizing weather-driven risk
 varies (peak vs. shoulder months). Included considerations for both frequency and magnitude of
 LOL. Some discussion of EUE. SPP weighed in about how this would work with SERVM and the
 way we do modeling now. No set industry standards for EUE.
- Requests for more information from SPP:
 - Season definition: Re-examine winter season bounds (e.g., focus on Dec–Feb, trim early/late shoulders).
 - o <u>Seasonal LOLE:</u> Compare seasonal PRM vs. peak-month PRM and assess if differences can be merged into a better construct.
- Risk accounting: Keep total LOLE budget = 0.01 (1-in-10). Evaluate options that concentrate risk in peak months vs. spread across all five months ensure the budget is maintained.
- Feasibility/data: May need to resurrect old data we used the define seasons.
- Open concern: Redefining seasons doesn't fully solve contracting needs in shoulder months.

Actions

- LOLE for Peak Season (option 4): See if we can get LOLE for Peka Season in Option 4.
- Season Durations: Look at old data used the define seasons and work with SPP to see if we have any new/better data.

5. Future Topics:

- Talk about threshold for re-study. WPP/SPP to connect in advance
- Contingency Reserves
- Methodology moving forward, some visualization may be helpful

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