01: Please supply any comments related to the Introduction, Definitions, or Background sections.

Cumulative Delivery Failure Window:  Shell Energy suggests a period of two years rather than five as stated in the BPM and Tariff.  A five-year period is an exceedingly punitive timeframe for failures to be “on an LRE’s record”.  We understand this definition is contained in the Tariff but believe it should be added to the list of items which require Tariff modification. 

02: Please supply any comments related to the Notification of Anticipated Delivery Failure section (3) .

No comment.  

03: Please supply any comments related to the Calculation of Delivery Failure Charge section (4).

No comment. 

04: Please supply any comments related to the Dollar Limit on Delivery Failure Charges During a Forward Showing Year section (5).

Energy Delivery Failure clarification: WPP should clarify if the index multiplier is or is not able to exceed the FERC hard cap for energy which is currently $2000/MWh for the Western Interconnection.  Shell Energy suggests any delivery failure be subject to FERC’s hard cap.  Stated another way, regardless of the penalty multiplier, any total penalty collected should not to exceed FERC’s hard energy price cap in place when an energy delivery failure is incurred.  Without clarification, penalties would likely be found unjust and unreasonable by FERC.

05: Please supply any comments related to the Allocation of Revenues from Payment of Delivery Failure Charges section (6).

Allocation of revenues from payment of delivery failure charges: Penalties associated with a delivery failure charges where the failure was fully covered by another entity or entities should not be used to offset WRAP program costs.  In doing so, the entity failing to deliver would still receive an indirect benefit through marginally lower WRAP program costs.  Shell Energy recommends any uplift in this case should be allocated proportionally to the entity/entities which covered the deficiency.  This is reasonable as it follows cost-causation principles. 

06: Please supply any comments related to the Waiver of an Energy Deployment Obligation section (7).

7.4 BPA Presumptive Waiver:  Shell Energy understands the Federal Power Act and BPA’s statutory preference necessitates flexibility in some cases and thus accepts that Section 7.4 Paragraph 2, subsections A, B and D are reasonable.  However, edits are required to Paragraph 1.  The Paragraph 2 subsection C should be entirely removed.  Shell Energy respectfully makes the following recommendations:

• Regarding Paragraph 1, the BPA Administrator or another Senior Executive should be required to provide assurance to the WPP Board of Directors, via an Attestation, that BPA would have violated its statutory obligations to give preference if it had fulfilled its WRAP obligation.  As drafted, it would be permissible for any Agency employee to provide Attestation.  This is not reasonable, and this assurance should come from at least a senior executive at BPA. 

 

• Paragraph 2, subsection C, which states “BPA was unable to acquire additional power, either in the market or through WRAP, during the holdback operation period in the amount requested by WPP” should be entirely removed.  While unlikely to occur and not in the spirit of Good Utility Practice, this section, as drafted, would grant BPA a blanket waiver should BPA not be able to provide holdback—for any reason.  This waiver is not afforded to any other WRAP participant.  In other words, Shell Energy cannot see a situation arising where, BPA’s unique statutory obligations would obviate the need to procure energy for holdback either through the market or via WRAP.  Subsection C should be deleted accordingly. 

07: Please supply any comments related to the Possible Expulsion for Repeated Energy Delivery Failures section (8).

Shell Energy believes this is reasonable.  

General Comment

Shell Energy North America (US), L.P. ("Shell Energy") appreciates the opportunity to provide limited comments to the WPP on WRAP BPM 209.